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NOTE

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON
FUEL STANDARD
Kathryn Abbott *
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), enacted as part of the
State’s pioneering Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), purports to regulate
the amount of carbon emissions associated with fuels consumed in the state. Part
of this scheme involves assigning numeric scores to vehicle fuels reflecting the
amount of carbon emissions associated with their production, transportation, and
use. The scores are part of a “cap-and-trade” scheme to lower the state’s total
amount of carbon emissions associated with fuel use. Out-of-state industry
groups brought a challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California, alleging that the LCFS violated the “dormant Commerce
Clause” of the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California agreed with the Plaintiffs, and issued a preliminary injunction. On October 16, 2013, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded.
This Note describes the background of the dormant Commerce Clause and its
application in previous environmental regulations. It then analyzes the arguments on both sides of the challenge to California’s LCFS, and suggests a course
of action for California and other states going forward to comply with the Constitution in this developing area of law. Finally, this Note discusses the
application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to the scenario of global climate change, and the relevance of global warming as a critical issue that states
can be allowed to regulate, especially when the federal government has not.
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INTRODUCTION
All over the world, the natural environment is shifting. In the coming
decades and centuries, scientists expect the changes to continue and accelerate. The shift is caused by global climate change spurred by the warming
effect o� high levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. In addition to rising temperatures worldwide, scientists predict
increased likelihood of destabilizing effects, including “[c]ontraction of
snow cover areas, increased thaw in permafrost regions, decrease in sea ice
extent”; “[i]ncreased frequency o� hot extremes, heat waves and heavy
precipitation”; “[i]ncrease in tropical cyclone intensity”; “[p]recipitation
increases in high latitudes”; “[p]recipitation decreases in subtropical land
regions”; and “decreased water resources in many semi-arid areas.” 1 Many
of these impacts are likely to affect California: it is the state with the third
highest amount of coastline by length, all of which is subject to rising sea
levels and resulting land loss. 2 Climate change also threatens California’s
water supply, such as through a decrease in the vital snow pack. 3
In the United States, transportation accounts for 28% of greenhouse gas
emissions. 4 For individuals, transportation makes up an even higher share
of greenhouse gas emissions: the U.S. Government estimates that 51% of
1.
Climate Change: Effects, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://climate.na
sa.gov/effects (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
2.
JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. INTERNATIONAL
BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS, at CRS-3 to -4 (2006). The two states with longer coastlines are
Alaska and Florida.
3.
CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., (2007), available
at http://www.water.ca.gov/climatechange/docs/062807factsheet.pdf.
4.
National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2013).
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each household’s “carbon footprint” results from transportation fuels. 5
Furthermore, each gallon of gasoline burned is estimated to result in twenty
pounds of added carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. 6 Worldwide, transportation is estimated to account for about 13% of total greenhouse gas
emissions. 7 Carbon in vehicle fuels, therefore, is an attractive point of attack for policymakers interested in reducing carbon output.
Despite these dire anticipated effects of climate change, policymakers
at the federal level had largely failed to address climate change by the early
2000s. 8 The existing federal framework for regulating air pollutants proved
inadequate to face the unique challenges posed by climate change: the 1970s
Clean Air Act envisioned the regulation of “criteria pollutants” posing a
direct danger to human health through inhalation. 9 This framework failed
to address climate change for several reasons. 10 For example, the Clean Air
Act applies to sources emitting just a few hundred tons of regulated pollutants per year; given the large volumes of carbon dioxide emitted by
individuals each year, many thousands of new sources would be brought
under regulation immediately were the Clean Air Act to apply to greenhouse gases. 11 This was an administrative headache the EPA could not
manage. As a result, it became clear that a new structure was needed to
address the unique concerns, and overwhelming scope, of the climate
change problem. 12 It was also clear that the federal government was in no
hurry to enact a solution. 13

5.
Reduce Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
feg/climate.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
6.
Id.
7.
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Figure: Global Anthropogenic GHG emissions, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/public
ations_and_data/ar4/syr/en/figure-spm-3.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
8.
See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza; see also Jason
Dearen, Calif. on Verge of Major Greenhouse Gas Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 16,
2010, available at http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/Dec/16/calif-on-verge-of-majorgreenhouse-gas-rules/?#article-copy.
9.
Six Common Air Pollutants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.ep
a.gov/air/urbanair/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
10.
See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012)
(describing the political and administrative difficulties in applying the existing Prevention of
Significant Deterioration [PSD] framework to climate change, which would “bring[] in
many thousands of sources into the program for the first time all at once”).
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 2.
13.
The Obama Administration has recently, as of this writing, begun to address
climate change increasingly within the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Obama Puts
Legacy at Stake with Clean-Air Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-act-reinterpreted-would-focus-on-flexibility-
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Facing this regulatory failure, California seized the opportunity to regulate greenhouse gases on its own. The State had long been a pioneer in
environmental regulations. A key example of this leadership involved the
regulation of mobile sources of air pollution in the 1970s in the Clean Air
Act. 14 Before the federal government undertook to regulate air pollution,
California had already taken steps to control pollution from vehicles
through motor vehicle emissions standards. 15 Once the federal government
passed the Clean Air Act and took control of air pollution, however, Section
209 of the Act disallowed states from creating regulations on mobile sources
more strict than those the federal government adopted, with the exception
that California may apply for a waiver from the EPA in order to pursue a
stricter standard for mobile sources. 16 This provision shields multi-state
commercial actors from the inefficiency o� having to comply with a patchwork of different standards in order to sell cars nationwide. California,
therefore, has long been a leader in environmental regulations, but federal
authority sometimes reins in the State’s efforts in the interests of national
consistency.
The Clean Air Act stands primarily as an example o� federal authority:
it centralized and nationalized the project of regulating air pollution in a
uniform manner. It also reigned in state regulation in Section 209, when it
disallowed states from regulating more stringently on their own, and
capped California’s ability to do so. Nevertheless, it is a principle o� federalism that states should be allowed to act as “laboratories” in which new
policies are dreamed of and tested. 17 This theory stems from a lengthy and
passionate dissent of Justice Brandeis, in which he wrote that it is “one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 18 The idea of
and-state-level-efforts.html?pagewanted=all. California’s actions, discussed here, predated
such efforts at the federal level.
14.
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1196 n.65 (1995) (“Congress first adopted the special provision for California in the Air
Quality Act of 1967 as a result of intense state lobbying. California had adopted motor
vehicle emission standards long before the federal government adopted such standards, and
thus the state led the way for federal standards.” (citation omitted)).
15.
Id.
16.
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b); California Waivers and Authorizations, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cafr.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). The
statute does not list California by name, but states that “The Administrator shall . . . waive
application of this section to any State which has adopted standards . . . for the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966.”
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). Only California had done so. In effect, then, the statute singled
California out.
17.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18.
Id.
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“states as laboratories” is invoked as a matter of course in discussions o�
federalism—especially by those supporting an embattled state policy. 19
Of course, as evidenced by California’s regulation of mobile sources before the Clean Air Act, there are some downsides to states’ abilities to act as
laboratories. In the context of civil rights, for example, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection and due process guarantees have long curtailed states’ authority to enact discriminatory laws. 20 The federal
government also tends to take over from states in situations where there
might otherwise be a “race to the bottom,” or a system of incentives for
states to compete for businesses by offering lower protections, such as for
the environment. 21
In addition to the above policy considerations that explain the interaction between state and federal regulators, the United States Constitution
has long been interpreted to limit the authority of states to regulate major
issues. The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the authority to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.” 22 Since the early nineteenth century, as this Note describes, that grant of authority has been interpreted as containing an
implicit restriction of the states’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.
In other words, that which Congress may regulate, the states may not.
Therefore, states may not regulate areas, such as commerce, that are delegated to Congress. This principle, as applied to the exclusive authority of
Congress over the ability to regulate Commerce, is known as the dormant
Commerce Clause. 23
This Note examines the history and current status of the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the applicability of the
dormant Commerce Clause in the context of California’s efforts to control
the emission of greenhouse gases. It analyzes one federal court’s finding
that California’s regulations did violate the Constitution, and discusses the
rejection of that reasoning on appeal at the Ninth Circuit. It argues that the
19.
See James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional
Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996).
20.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Bd. o� Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21.
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 581 (2007) (describing the
Clean Air Act’s federal role in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards as “a classic
regulatory function of government, as is the prevention of ‘race to the bottom’ collective
action problems that might ensue if regional authorities competed with one another for
industry by progressively lowering pollution standards that could ultimately leave all worse
of�”).
22.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23.
See infra Part III.
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methods California used to reduce the “carbon intensity” of vehicle fuels
are not facially invalid as discriminating against interstate commerce, and
that the appropriate test in a legal challenge would be a balancing test,
weighing California’s interest in the environment against the burdens it
imposes on interstate commerce.
More broadly, this Note discusses the emerging recognition of global
climate change as a “legitimate local purpose.” 24 With this recognition, it
becomes more possible for states validly to use otherwise-illegal discriminatory means to solve environmental problems. At the same time, the Note
acknowledges the peculiar legal stance associated with this recognition.
Another article in this issue describes the dormant Commerce Clause
at length and provides a good deal o� background on the broader schemes
California has used to curb global climate change. This Note delves more
deeply into one regulatory regime used by California’s Air and Resources
Board, which is known as the Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). This
Note also deals specifically with the federal challenge to the LCFS, and the
legal developments represented by that challenge.

I. GLOBAL WARMING AND CALIFORNIA
The risks California faces due to global warming have been well documented. 25 In view of these concerns, the California legislature was anxious
to craft legislation that would effectively reduce harmful impacts on California. 26 In addition, the legislature recognized the historic position
California found itself in: it was keen to craft legislation that might serve as
a model for the rest of the nation. Mary Nichols, the chairwoman of the
California Air Resources Board (CARB), explained that California was
trying to “fill the vacuum created by the failure of Congress to pass any
kind of climate or energy legislation for many years now.” 27
At the end of these deliberations in 2006, California enacted the Global
Warming Solutions Act, better known as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32). 28 The
new law set several ambitious targets to dramatically reduce California’s
climate change-inducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as requiring CARB
“to adopt regulations to require the reporting and verification of statewide
24.
See infra Parts III(B), III(F), IV(A)(2).
25.
See generally Reports on the Third Assessment from the California Climate Change
Center, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE PORTAL, CA.GOV, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/
adaptation/third_assessment/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). The site also includes comprehensive information about California’s coordinated efforts to adapt to climate change.
26.
Dearen, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27.
Id.
28.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 526,
except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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greenhouse gas emissions and to monitor and enforce compliance with this
program.” 29 CARB was also required, among other things, to “adopt a
statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit equivalent to the statewide greenhouse gas emissions levels in 1990 to be achieved by 2020” and to adopt
“rules and regulations in an open public process to achieve the maximum
technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reductions.” 30

II. THE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD
Pursuant to AB 32 and an executive order of Governor Schwarzenegger, CARB enacted the LCFS in 2007. 31 The LCFS was to involve
collaboration between multiple groups within California’s Environmental
Protection Agency, the University of California, and others to establish a
compliance schedule to meet AB 32’s aggressive 2020 target for 1990-level
emissions. 32 The LCFS was to reduce the amount of carbon emissions
associated with vehicle fuels sold and consumed in California, as part of an
array of regulations that would reduce California’s overall carbon emissions. 33 By establishing “carbon intensity ratings” for categories of vehicle
fuels, the LCFS provided a metric for identifying how much carbon was
associated with all types of vehicle fuels in the state. 34
The LCFS took a holistic view o� fuels’ carbon intensities, looking to
greenhouse gas emissions associated with all stages of their production. 35
One factor in the score was the amount of transportation involved in the
fuels’ consumption in California. 36 This led to the result that out-of-state
fuels chronically scored much higher than in-state fuels, although Midwestern corn ethanol-based fuels and Brazilian sugarcane-based fuels also
received top ratings by CARB. 37
The LCFS applies to any transportation fuel for sale in California. 38
One type of transportation fuel regulated under the LCFS, at the heart of
the dispute in this paper, is ethanol, of which 98 percent is made from
29.
Assemb. B. 32, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2006).
30.
Id.
31.
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CA.GOV, http://www.ene
rgy.ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.3(b) (2012).
35.
Kirk Tracy, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene: Low Carbon Fuel
Standards, Lifecycle Greenhouse Gases, and California’s Continued Struggle to Lead the Way, 24
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 174 (2010).
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.1 (2012).
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corn. 39 Ethanol is an “alcohol-based fuel made by fermenting and distilling
starch crops, such as corn”; the resulting ethanol can be used separately or
mixed with traditional gasoline. 40 The primary benefits of ethanol over
gasoline are its lower carbon emissions (the LCFS’s primary concern), and
its ability to reduce the need for imported oil. 41 Corn destined to become
ethanol for consumption in California is either shipped to California and
processed into ethanol there, or produced elsewhere and shipped into California as a finished product. 42 The finished product “travels by truck or rail
to facilities where it is blended with gasoline.” 43
The vehicle fuels regulated under the LCFS are assigned a “carbon intensity” (CI) score, reflecting the amount of greenhouse-gas emissions
associated both with the fuel itself as well as with the circumstances of its
production. 44 This CI score is assigned to categories of vehicle fuels as a
matter of convenience, but producers may request a customized score from
CARB if they wish, in a process known as “Method 2A or 2B.” 45 For any
such individualized CI score to be approved, “the regulated party must
demonstrate that the method is . . . scientifically defensible.” 46 Moreover,
the Executive Officer of CARB is tasked with reviewing CI scores and may
choose a value that “most closely corresponds” to the category, or “pathway,”
for a particular “fuel or blendstock.” 47 To determine the score, all aspects of
the fuel’s “life cycle” are taken into account, including the geographic region
in which the fuel was produced and the amount of distance the fuel was
transported into California. 48 The average categorical scores are changed
yearly. 49
CARB was to begin reducing the total CI allowed in the state, beginning by small increments in 2011 and going down a full 10 percent (to 90
percent of existing values) by 2020. 50 To this end, regulated parties were
required to calculate their CI value, which would generate either a credit or
deficit, depending on how much the party had reduced its CI score. 51 Par39.
Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief at paras. 14–15, Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 109CV02234),
2009 WL 5421971 [hereinafter Complaint].
40.
Ethanol, FUELECONOMY.GOV, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/ethanol.shtml
(last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
41.
Id.
42.
Complaint, supra note 39, paras. 14–15.
43.
Id. para. 15.
44.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486 (2012).
45.
Id. § 95486(c).
46.
Id. § 95486(e).
47.
Id. § 95486(a)(3)(A).
48.
Id. § 95486(a)(2)(C)–(D).
49.
Id. § 95486(b) tbl.8.
50.
Id. § 95482.
51.
Id. § 95485(a).
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ties would then have the option to trade credits and deficits, resulting in a
“cap-and-trade” scheme. 52
The LCFS contained a table, known as “Table 6,” or the “Carbon Intensity Lookup Table for Gasoline and Fuels that Substitute for
Gasoline.” 53 It gave a long list of categories o� fuels based on type and
origin, each with a corresponding “Pathway Identifier.” 54 These pathways
each were assigned three scores for CI: a score for “Direct Emissions,” a
score for the carbon intensity of “Land Use or Other Indirect Effect,” and a
“Total” score. 55 While it does not bear listing all of the scores here, some
examples are that the total scores for “Midwest Average” was 99.40 grams
of carbon dioxide per megajoule (gCO2e/MJ), compared with a “California
Average” of 95.66 gCO2e/MJ. 56 The lowest average score on the list was
“Landfill gas (bio-methane) cleaned up to pipeline quality NG [Natural
Gas]; compressed in CA,” which had a CI value of 11.26 gCO2e/MJ. 57 In
general, Brazilian sugarcane also received relatively low CI scores, such as
58.40 gCO2e/MJ for “Brazilian sugarcane with average production process,
mechanized harvesting and electricity co-product credit,” and 73.40
gCO2e/MJ for “Brazilian sugarcane using average production processes.” 58
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the mechanics of the LCFS were not agreeable
to industry groups and other interested parties—particularly those receiving relatively high CI scores in the Midwest, who perceived a protectionist,
pro-California economic motivation. They proceeded to challenge the
standard on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, under the so-called “dormant Commerce Clause”
theory. 59

III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution confers upon
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 60 The so-called
52.
Id. § 95485(c). Emissions trading, or “cap-and-trade,” is a market-based approach
used to control pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving reductions in the
emissions of pollutants. See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 01-58,
2001).
53.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95486(b) tbl.6.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
See infra Part IV.
60.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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“dormant” or “negative” commerce doctrine, though o� long standing, does
not appear in the text of the Constitution. 61 Instead, it is the theory that no
body other than Congress may regulate interstate or foreign commerce, as
Congress holds exclusive power to do so in the text of the Constitution.
Therefore, even when Congress has failed to act, no other body may legislate in the arena Congress has been delegated. 62
Chief Justice John Marshall was among the first to articulate this principle. In Gibbons v. Ogden, he wrote that New York’s grant to individuals the
exclusive rights to navigate the waters within the state was “repugnant” to
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which “authorizes Congress
to regulate commerce.” 63 Marshall argued that the structure of the Constitution could not withstand the ability of states to regulate interstate
commerce: “If there were no power in the general government, to control
this extreme belligerent legislation of the States, the powers of the government were essentially deficient.” 64 Finally, Marshall wrote that the
assignment of the commerce power to Congress was “an investment of
power for the general advantage” in Congress’s hands, “which power can
never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the
hands of agents, or lie dormant.” 65 It is from this phrase that the “dormant”
Commerce Clause draws its name.
During the last two centuries, the Supreme Court has continued to apply the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court uses two tests to determine
whether state action violates the dormant Commerce Clause. In the first,
known as the “strict scrutiny” test, a court determines whether a state law
discriminates purposefully, facially, or in effect against interstate commerce. 66 The court will also determine whether the statute regulates
“extraterritorially”—whether it seeks to control behavior occurring purely
outside its borders. 67 Statutes that discriminate or regulate extraterritorially
are subject to “strict scrutiny,” and the state bears the burden of demonstrating “both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.” 68

61.
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 338, 342–343 (2007).
62.
See, e.g., id.
63.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1824).
64.
Id. at 5.
65.
Id. at 189.
66.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
67.
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder,
700 F.3d 796, 807 (6th Cir. 2012).
68.
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Statutes that discriminate only incidentally are subject to the Pike balancing test, named after Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. The Supreme Court
established that statutes not discriminating on their face against interstate
commerce “violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens they impose
on interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.’ ” 69

A. The Choice of Test
The beginning of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis is the determination of which legal test is appropriate to evaluate the state law in
question. First, the court must determine “whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce.” 70 Discrimination for these purposes
“simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” 71 If the court
finds that “a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se
invalid.” 72 This is known as the “strict scrutiny” test, and it is so demanding
that only one state law has ever survived it in the Supreme Court. 73 Next, if
the court finds that the ordinance itself does not discriminate, the court
determines whether it “imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ” 74
The determination of what constitutes “discrimination” arises from the
statute on its face, its text, its purposes, and its effects. Broadly speaking,
the statute is not discriminatory if it “regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest.” 75 Even though a statute can discriminate
without a determination that its purpose is to discriminate, protectionism is
an important piece of the logic here: the Supreme Court has identified the
“crucial inquiry” as “whether [the law] is basically a protectionist measure,
or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.” 76
Even without facial discrimination—such as when a law, by its terms,
applies evenly to everyone—the law may still discriminate against interstate
commerce if it has discriminatory effects. For example, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the Supreme Court held that a North
Carolina law was discriminatory where it required apples sold in the state
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
Id.
See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 146 (discussed below).
C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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to bear only the USDA label. 77 The law discriminated because “North Carolina . . . had never established a grading and inspection system,” so “the
statute had no effect on the existing practices o� North Carolina producers,”
but “Washington growers and dealers . . . were forced to alter their longestablished procedures, at substantial cost, or abandon the North Carolina
market.” 78 Therefore, a law applying even-handedly to all parties might still
discriminate if it has the effect of placing substantial barriers on interstate
commerce without effectively furthering its “laudable goal” of protecting
consumers from fraud. 79
Finally, the strict scrutiny test will be applied if the law regulates extraterritorially—that is, if the state attempts to regulate behavior occurring
beyond its borders. This doctrine of the Commerce Clause applies in two
situations: where the state attempts to regulate “commerce that takes place
wholly outside o�” its borders, “whether or not the commerce has effects
within the state”; and where the statute “directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries o�” the state. 80 The court will also
consider whether the “statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory
regimes of other States and what effect would arise” if more states adopted
similar legislation in order to guard against the “projection of one state
81
regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.” In the extraterritoriality analysis, the “ ‘critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the
82
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.’ ”

B. Strict Scrutiny: Legitimate Local Purpose
Once the court has determined that the strict scrutiny test is applicable,
the first step in applying it is determining whether the State acted in furtherance of a compelling state interest or “legitimate local interest.” 83
However, in applying the strict scrutiny test, courts rarely dwell on the
discussion of what constitutes a legitimate local interest. 84 Instead, courts
appear to presume that any purpose beyond simple economic protection77.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 340 (1977).
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 353.
80.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
81.
Id. at 1090. Courts phrase this consideration in terms of “economic Balkanization.”
82.
Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
83.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994).
84.
Courts differ in their choice of words for the test; satisfactory interests are described either as “compelling” or “legitimate”; and the word “purpose” appears
interchangeably with the word “interest.” For example, C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392, uses
“legitimate local interest.” Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1970) uses both “compelling state interest” and “legitimate local purpose.”
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ism, and probably excluding otherwise illegal purposes, are valid. 85 The case
law is somewhat undeveloped at this step, because when strict scrutiny is
applied, the statutes almost always fail for being discriminatory. Indeed, the
strict scrutiny test is so demanding that discriminatory laws are said to be
almost per se invalid. 86 Therefore, courts rarely reach the discussion of what
legitimate environmental local purposes might be; it is possible that all
environmental purposes, so long as they do not stem from protectionism,
are valid. 87
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that “a so-called flow control
ordinance, which requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated
transfer station before leaving the municipality” violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because the ordinance “depriv[ed] competitors, including
out-of-state firms, of access to a local market.” 88 The “avowed purpose of
the ordinance,” which was “to retain the processing fees charged at the
transfer station to amortize the cost of the facility,” was not the sort o�
legitimate local purpose a government must demonstrate in order to be able
to discriminate. 89 Further, even if the Court had accepted financing as a
legitimate local purpose, the State must show that there were no other
reasonable, non-discriminatory means to achieve that end. 90
Similarly, Oregon’s waste disposal regime, which subjected disposers of
waste generated out-of-state to surcharges roughly three times higher than
disposers of in-state waste, was facially invalid under the strict scrutiny
test. 91 The Court held that economic and “resource” protectionism, both of
which would provide preferable treatment to Oregon economic interests,
could never be valid local interests to satisfy the test. 92

85.
For example, it can be assumed that the Court would not declare “valid” the state
purpose to discriminate on the basis of race.
86.
See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 511 U.S. 93, 100
(1994).
87.
Cf. City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). Even bona fide
goals in the public interest violate the Commerce Clause if the means of achieving them is
protectionist. The Supreme Court wrote in City of Philadelphia that discriminatory legislation
was nearly always invalid, “whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady
supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition . . . or to create
jobs by keeping industry within the State . . . or to preserve the State’s financial resources
from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants . . . . In each of these cases, a presumably
legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State
from the national economy.” Id.
88.
C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 392–94.
91.
Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 108.
92.
Id. at 107.
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Prior to 2011, no state had identified global climate change as a legitimate local purpose justifying the use of discriminatory means. There had
not been the opportunity to do so: few states had serious climate change
legislation before California passed its climate change law in 2006. 93 However, an analogy to the argument that global climate change might be a
state’s concern can be found in the landmark Massachusetts v. EPA case.
There, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the
Clean Air Act, as Massachusetts had demonstrated the requisite level of
injury from global climate change, and had demonstrated that the EPA was
failing to regulate a significant contributor to that phenomenon—vehicle
emissions of greenhouse gases. 94 For example, since the “rising seas have
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land,” and because “the
Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,
. . . it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.” 95
The Court also suggested that the special status Massachusetts held as a
sovereign imputed to it some of the injury resulting from the effects of
global climate change on lands in its domain: given “Massachusetts’ stake in
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,” the State “is entitled to special
solicitude” in the standing analysis. 96 This holding suggests that states may
have special interests in the regulation of climate change.

C. Very Legitimate Interests: Health and Safety Laws
Some cases have implied that a somewhat higher level of constitutional
deference must be given to states regulating to protect health and safety, as
well as other areas of traditional state concern. However, this factor is
somewhat inconsistently applied. For example, in United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court wrote that the
ordinances at issue were “exercises of the police power in an effort to address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern o� local
government.” 97 Therefore, the Court declined the Plaintiffs’ invitation to
“hold that laws favoring public entities while treating all private businesses
93.
See, e.g., Peter Henderson, A Threat to California’s Climate Change Progress, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/business/energy-environment/
20green.html?_r=0 (explaining that “California is the clear U.S. leader on addressing climate
change,” and that the “U.S. climate change bill, which passed the House o� Representatives
but failed in the Senate, was modeled after California’s 2006 law”).
94.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 523 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95.
Id. at 522.
96.
Id. at 520.
97.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 347 (2007).
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the same are subject to an almost per se rule of invalidity,” implying that
such rigorous scrutiny of “economic legislation passed under the auspices of
the police power” was a remnant of the bygone Lochner era of judicial supremacy. 98 Similarly, the Court affirmed in Maine v. Taylor that “[a]s long
as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place
itself in a position of economic isolation, . . . it retains broad regulatory
authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of
its natural resources.” 99 Thus, the Court begins these cases in a stance of (at
least formal) deference to states’ positions of authority to regulate health
and safety within their borders.
Despite the Court’s deference to state police power, regulation o�
health and safety is not a shield against the requirements of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Consistent with the logic of the balancing test, dire
health concerns may merit harsh restrictions on interstate commerce; for
example, many quarantine laws have passed muster, especially when they
were targeted to the specific source of contagion. 100 On the other hand, a
New Jersey statute banning the import of waste into the state was held to
fail the balancing test, despite the State’s allegations that the law protected
the public health. 101 That law was not analogous to the valid quarantine
laws, according to the Court, because the “harms caused by waste are said to
arise after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point . . . there is no basis
to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste.” 102 The Court found
that there was an impermissible disconnect between the State’s assertions
that waste threatened the public health and the State’s chosen remedy,
which was to ban only out-of-state waste, with no explanation for why only
that waste threatened health. 103 In short, the Court concluded that the law
must have been a thinly-veiled protectionist measure to attempt to reduce
the size o� New Jersey’s landfills through the impermissible means of restricting interstate commerce. 104

98.
Id. (referencing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
99.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100.
See City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978) (“The appellees argue that not all laws which facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce are
forbidden protectionist regulations. In particular, they point to quarantine laws, which this
Court has repeatedly upheld even though they appear to single out interstate commerce for
special treatment . . . . But those quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such as
diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their very movement
risked contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did not discriminate against interstate
commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.”).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 629.
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Finally, even though state laws regulating health and safety have traditionally been afforded a measure of deference by the courts, this stance was
called into question by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 105 In that case, the Supreme Court held that it was not the role of the
federal judiciary to determine which realms were and were not traditionally
the zones of state authority for the purposes of the Tenth Amendment,
which guarantees that all powers not given to Congress remain with the
states. 106 The court overruled the 1976 case National League of Cities v. Usery,
which had identified the arenas that were traditional state functions that the
federal government could not permissibly regulate. 107 In Garcia, the Court
held that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity
in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable but is
also inconsistent with established principles o� federalism and, indeed, with
those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.” 108 However, the Court decided United Haulers in 1997, over ten
years after Garcia. United Haulers included some of the strongest language
suggestive of deference to traditional areas of state concern. 109 Therefore, it
is unclear the extent to which Garcia has changed the stance courts must
take in weighing state health and safety laws for the purposes of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
It is also unclear whether the amount of deference courts grant to a
state under the Tenth Amendment, as in Garcia, differs from the amount of
deference due when testing a state law under the dormant Commerce
Clause. The two provisions both appear in the Constitution, with neither
taking an obvious position of inferiority to the either. Some scholars and
Supreme Court Justices have found an affirmative guarantee in the Tenth
Amendment, suggesting that it grants states certain powers or privileges,
whereas others regard it only as a passive guarantee sketching out the relationship between the federal and state governments. 110 The dormant
105.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
106.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
107.
See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1976).
108.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
109.
See supra text accompanying note 97.
110.
Traditionally, it was more common for courts to hold that the Tenth Amendment
was merely a truism. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in
the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution
before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able
to exercise fully their reserved powers.”). However, some recent cases have adopted the idea
that the Tenth Amendment creates affirmative limitations on the federal government’s
authority. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
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Commerce Clause seems to mirror the “truism” model of the Tenth
Amendment: that is, it stands for the proposition that the states cannot do
what Congress can in relation to commerce. Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause mirrors the “size” of Congress’s Commerce power: a state
regulation would not implicate the dormant Commerce Clause unless it
involved a regulation Congress would also be permitted to enact. This
analysis does not inform how to balance the two Constitutional provisions,
but it suggests that a State defending its law against a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge should allege that the challenge infringes upon the borders
of the Tenth Amendment. The State could rely on the idea that the Tenth
Amendment has some affirmative power, and that the federal government
should not diminish that authority.

D. Strict Scrutiny: Reasonable Nondiscriminatory Alternatives
Finally, once a court has determined that a legitimate local purpose existed to justify discrimination in the strict scrutiny test, courts consider
whether non-discriminatory alternatives existed that the State could have
employed to achieve the desired interest. Since so many strict scrutiny cases
fail at the first stage, when the court determines that the law is protectionist, it is somewhat rare to get a glimpse of what might satisfy a court for the
purposes of determining whether there were no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to the discriminatory legislation. However, in a
case challenging a municipal ordinance in Madison, Wisconsin that required all milk from outside the city to be pasteurized within five miles of
the city, the court described that there were “reasonable and adequate alternatives” available to safeguard the quality of milk in Madison. 111 For
example, the Court suggested that the City could charge the milk importers
“the actual and reasonable cost” of inspection by the City’s own trusted
officials, rather than insisting on local pasteurization. 112
In Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court analyzed a Maine law banning
the importation o� live baitfish into the state, which was intended to stop
the spread of invasive species and parasites. 113 The Court found that “[n]o
matter how one describes the abstract issue whether ‘alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce,’ . . . the more specific question whether scientifically
accepted techniques exist for the sampling and inspection o� live baitfish is
one o� fact.” 114 Furthermore, the Court held that the district court’s “finding
that such techniques have not been devised cannot be characterized as
111.
112.
113.
114.

Dean Milk Co. v. City o� Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354–55 (1951).
Id.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 146 (1986) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
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clearly erroneous,” and that “the record probably could not support a contrary finding.” 115 This standard does not require the development of new
technologies that would achieve the ends without discrimination; therefore,
the Plaintiffs’ assertions that other methods of controlling invasive species
and parasites might be developed did not mean that Maine could not use the
means most readily available to it in the present—the banning of importation. 116

E. The Pike Balancing Test
In contrast with the virtual per se invalidity of statutes confronting the
strict scrutiny test, the Pike balancing test tends to be highly deferential. As
long as three conditions are met, the statute is likely to be upheld. 117 Laws
confronting the Pike standard have already met the first condition—that
they do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce, but that
they only discriminate in their impacts. 118 Next, the law must serve a valid,
empirically demonstrable purpose for the state. 119 Finally, the demonstrated
impacts to interstate commerce must not be badly outweighed by the
demonstrated burdens the state desires. 120
In 2007, the Supreme Court upheld a New York “flow control” ordinance that required all waste to be processed through a state-owned public
benefit corporation. 121 The Court reasoned that the flow ordinance should
be subject to the Pike balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, because all
businesses, whether in- or out-of-state, were subject to precisely the same
laws, and therefore the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 122 Employing the balancing test, the Court found that the legitimate local interests in creating “a convenient and effective way to finance
[the affected counties’] integrated package of waste disposal services,” and
in “increas[ing] recycling” outweighed the discriminatory impacts on interstate commerce, which were entirely theoretical: the lower courts had found
no demonstrated impacts at all. 123
Courts defer to the State’s judgment about what non-protectionist
goals it wishes to achieve, but a major factor in the balancing test is the
ability of the State to demonstrate empirically that the effects it is imposing
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 147.
117.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 334 (2007).
122.
Id. at 345–46.
123.
Id. at 346.
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on interstate commerce are justified in relation to the benefits the State
desires. Justice Blackmun emphasized that, so long as “safety justifications
[for a law] are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative
judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on
interstate commerce.” 124 States often fail, however, to demonstrate that the
benefits are not illusory, or that they are weighty enough to justify serious
impacts on interstate commerce. 125 Iowa’s ban on trailers sixty-five feet and
longer, purportedly to avoid the dangers associated with long trailers, was
held invalid where there was no real evidence showing that sixty-five-foot
trailers were any less safe than shorter ones, and in fact “[s]tatistical studies” had showed no safety difference at all. 126 Similarly, the Court struck
down an Arizona law regulating the length of train cars as passing “beyond
what is plainly essential for safety since it does not appear that [the law]
will lessen rather than increase the danger of accident.” 127

F. Pike Balancing Test: Legitimate Local Purposes
Even compelling health justifications do not inoculate a law from
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under the more forgiving Pike test.
The City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Court stated that “[a]ll objects of
interstate trade,” including “innately harmful articles,” “merit Commerce
Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset.” 128 Rather
than setting out a “two-tiered” system of dormant Commerce Clause analysis, wherein certain dangerous objects were excluded from protection
altogether, earlier cases had held “simply that because the articles’ worth in
interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their
very movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state
lines.” 129 In other words, all articles warrant constitutional protection, even
those that are “valueless” wastes. 130 However, there is a type of cost-benefit
analysis courts employ: if the articles are worth very little and there are
strong reasons to regulate them, the court will tip the balance in favor of
the state’s regulation. 131 States can likely pass laws to regulate harmful
products without unduly interfering with interstate commerce because the
health stakes are so high.
124.
Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
125.
See, e.g., id. at 443.
126.
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670, 673 (1981).
127.
S. Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781–82 (1945).
128.
City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622–23 (1978).
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.

198

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:1

Because of the balancing nature of the Pike test, the burden placed on
the regulated articles must be “clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits” in order to invalidate the law. 132 Therefore, no matter how
grave the peril the State attempts to regulate, the burden must be far worse.
For a serious issue such as climate change, it would probably take an extreme burden to warrant overturning a state regulation under the Pike test.

IV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION CHALLENGE
Alleging that the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause, farmers and farmer and industry groups brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California on December 23,
2009. 133 The Plaintiffs sought injunctions against the LCFS, arguing it was
unconstitutional for three reasons. First, they alleged that it “conflicts with
and is preempted by federal law, including the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007.” 134 Second, they argued that “it interferes with the
regulation of interstate commerce.” 135 Finally, they argued that “it discriminates against out-of-state corn ethanol producers and importers and
improperly regulates their extraterritorial conduct.” 136 The final two allegations formed their argument that the LCFS violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.
In support of its allegations about the dormant Commerce Clause violation, the Complaint focused on the way in which the LCFS regulated
extraterritorially. It pointed out that, “[�]or ethanol produced outside California, only two parts of the overall lifecycle of the ethanol—transportation
of the ethanol within California and the combustion of ethanol in a motor
vehicle in operation—occur inside California.” 137 The Complaint also challenged California’s calculation of the carbon intensity, which took into
account the “so-called indirect ‘land use or other indirect effect’ from the
production of corn itself, predominantly in the Midwest, ascribing a penalty to all corn ethanol based on its assumed indirect contribution to

132.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
133.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
134.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 1. The “farmer Plaintiffs” consisted of the Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union (RMFU), Redwood County Minnesota Corn and Soybean Growers, Penny Newman Grain, Inc., Fresno County Farm Bureau, Nisei Farmers League, and
California Dairy Campaign. The “industry Plaintiffs” consisted of Growth Energy and the
Renewable Fuels Association. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1096–
1097.
135.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 1.
136.
Id.
137.
Id. para. 40.
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worldwide [greenhouse gas (GHG)] emissions.” 138 As a result of this calculation, the Plaintiffs alleged that the LCFS “penalizes all corn ethanol based
on the purported indirect effects of assumed farming practices that occur
predominantly outside California, and through the regulation, California
seeks to curb or eliminate these farming practices throughout the United
States and beyond by making the entire corn ethanol market responsible for
them.” 139 The Complaint further alleged that California discriminated
against ethanol produced outside California, especially that produced in the
Midwest. 140 The Complaint suggested that CARB regulated this way due to
a “preference” for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, which scored relatively
better. 141 Finally, the Complaint alleged that the LCFS would economically
injure Midwestern ethanol producers both by imposing compliance costs on
them through the cap-and-trade scheme, and by shifting Californian demand for ethanol to Brazilian sugarcane. 142
At the district court, Judge O’Neill found in the Plaintiffs’ favor in December of 2011. 143 He held that the LCFS was subject to strict scrutiny
review due to its discrimination against out-of-state commerce, because the
LCFS automatically assigned a higher score to other states’ fuels. 144 The
court further held that, while the LCFS did serve the legitimate local purpose of reducing the risks of global warming, California failed to establish
that it could not have used other nondiscriminatory means, such as a carbon
tax or greater vehicle efficiency, to achieve that purpose. 145 Accordingly, the
LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
California appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which heard oral arguments
in October of 2012. 146 The Ninth Circuit judges agreed to a temporary
reinstatement of the LCFS, but appeared to be somewhat unsympathetic to
California’s arguments that the LCFS did not discriminate against other
states. 147 They issued a ruling on October 16, 2013, discussed below.

138.
Id. para. 41.
139.
Id. para. 42.
140.
Id. paras. 44–45.
141.
Id. paras. 43–44.
142.
Id. paras. 56–60.
143.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
144.
Id. at 1087, 1089.
145.
Id. at 1093–94.
146.
Karen Gullo, California Asks Court to Reinstate Carbon Fuel Standard, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 16, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-16/california-asks-courtto-reinstate-carbon-fuel-standard.html (discussing what would become Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013)).
147.
Id.
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A. Challenge in the Eastern District of California
At the District Court for the Eastern District of California, the coalition o� farmers, farming organizations, and corn ethanol industry groups
suing CARB successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against CARB’s
LCFS. 148 Judge O’Neill agreed with them that the standard unconstitutionally regulated interstate commerce, finding that the LCFS facially
discriminated against interstate commerce. Accordingly, he applied the
strict scrutiny test. 149 While he agreed with California that reducing global
warming was a legitimate local purpose justifying state action, he found
that the State could have used other, non-discriminatory alternative
measures to achieve their desired ends. 150
In this section, I will argue, as the Ninth Circuit later agreed, that
Judge O’Neill applied the wrong test when he held that the LCFS facially
discriminated against interstate commerce; instead, the Pike balancing test,
rather than the strict scrutiny test, is appropriate. 151 Next, I will discuss the
significance of Judge O’Neill’s finding that global warming was a legitimate
local purpose, and the implications of this finding for future states’ regulatory schemes. Finally, I will discuss and critique Judge O’Neill’s finding
that there were nondiscriminatory alternatives California could have used.
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed
on December 23, 2009, alleged two violations o� law. First, it alleged that
the LCFS was preempted by federal law, including the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). 152 Second, relevant here, the complaint
alleged that the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating impermissibly against Midwestern corn ethanol producers. 153
148.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
149.
Id. at 1089.
150.
Id. at 1093–94.
151.
The Ninth Circuit remanded to determine whether the strict scrutiny test might
still be applicable because the LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect. If not, the Pike
balancing test will be applied. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013).
152.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 1. The Plaintiffs heavily emphasized their first
legal challenge to the LCFS: that it was preempted by federal law. They alleged that, because
federal law, including the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), comprehensively
regulated oil and gas, that states could not do so as well. However, the District Court for the
Eastern District of California, Judge O’Neill, ruled that the farmer Plaintiffs lacked standing
to bring the preemption claim, and the industry groups’ individual Plaintiffs similarly lacked
standing to make the challenge based on EISA. Moreover, Judge O’Neill held that the
remaining Plaintiffs who had standing for the preemption challenge had failed to demonstrate that summary judgment was appropriate, so he denied their summary judgment
motion on preemption. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at
1094–95, 1103.
153.
Complaint, supra note 39, paras. 49–50.
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Perhaps to underscore the irrationality of CARB’s chosen tool of regulation,
the Plaintiffs emphasized that corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas emissions relative to traditional liquid fuels. 154
The Plaintiffs failed to obtain summary judgment on the federal
preemption issue, as the court ruled they lacked standing. 155 However, they
persuaded the court to grant them summary judgment on the dormant
Commerce Clause issues. 156 Judge O’Neill issued a preliminary injunction
against CARB, finding that the LCFS impermissibly discriminated against
interstate commerce. 157

1. The Choice o� Test
The first step in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, both in the
pleadings and in Judge O’Neill’s opinion, was to identify which dormant
Commerce Clause test was appropriate for the analysis of the LCFS. Given
that Maine v. Taylor stands as the only example of a state law upheld under
the strict scrutiny test, neither party could fail to appreciate the vital importance of the choice of test. In the Equal Protection context, a similarly
demanding test has been called “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” 158 That is,
since so few laws survive this level o� heightened scrutiny, the choice of test
may be the most important part of the analysis.
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs argued that LCFS was appropriately
considered under a strict scrutiny test because it discriminated against
interstate commerce in effect, if not in purpose. 159 One way the Plaintiffs
attempted to demonstrate the appropriateness of the strict scrutiny test was
by demonstrating that the LCFS regulated extraterritorial conduct. The
Complaint alleged that, for “ethanol produced outside California, only two
parts of the overall lifecycle of the ethanol—transportation of the ethanol
within California and the combustion of ethanol in a motor vehicle in operation—occur inside California.” 160 However, the LCFS lookup table took
into account all stages of the ethanol production in order to assign a carbon
intensity score. For example, CARB “purported to gauge the so-called
indirect ‘land use or other indirect effect’ from the production of corn itself,
predominately in the Midwest, ascribing a penalty to all corn ethanol based
on its assumed indirect contribution to worldwide GHG emissions” because CARB believed that, “by participating in the market for certain
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. para. 11.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Complaint, supra note 39, para 81.
Id. para. 40.
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biofuels, regulated parties incentivize other, non-regulated parties all over
the world to turn non-agricultural land into agricultural land; that land-use
change by third parties supposedly releases GHG emissions, which CARB
in turn attributes to the use o� biofuels in this country.” 161 In other words,
California was regulating conduct occurring purely outside its borders when
it considered, for example, the way in which the corn was grown in the
Midwest, and the ripple effects of agricultural land use.
The Complaint also argued that the LCFS merited the strict scrutiny
test because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce by drawing geographical distinctions. The LCFS allegedly “draws significant
distinctions among different producers of U.S. corn ethanol, depending on
whether the ethanol is produced in California or outside California.” 162 As
evidence, the Complaint emphasized that “for at least four corn ethanol fuel
pathways, the ‘look-up table’ assigns a higher total carbon intensity value to
corn ethanol originating in the Midwest than to identical corn ethanol
originating in California, based on factors almost entirely beyond any single
producer’s control.” 163 The Plaintiffs acknowledged that some of this discrepancy was due to “the carbon emitted during the interstate
transportation of their ethanol.” 164 Indeed, the Plaintiffs went on to insist
that any distinctions made on the basis of transportation would discriminate: “Tying carbon intensity scores to the distance a good travels in
interstate commerce discriminates against interstate commerce,” they stated
plainly. 165
Finally, the Plaintiffs emphasized that, in order to maintain their competitiveness in California, the already-embattled Midwestern corn ethanol
producers would effectively be forced to either change their behavior to suit
CARB’s whims or to purchase cap-and-trade credits on the California market. 166 Regulated parties, according to the Plaintiffs, could only generate
credits “if the state approves o� how that party produces, ships, delivers,
and distributes its product, beginning at the location(s) where some components are produced, be they in-state or out-of-state, and ending in
California.” 167 This suggestion demonstrated California’s extraterritorial
regulation. If true, it suggested that the State is forcing out-of-state pro-

161.
Id. para. 41.
162.
Id. para. 44.
163.
Id. para. 45.
164.
Id.
165.
Memorandum in Support o� Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 109CV02234),
2010 WL 5882459.
166.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 46.
167.
Id. (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95484(d)(2) (2013)).
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ducers either to change their behavior in specific ways, or to undertake new
costs.
California responded to these allegations with a vociferous defense of
its position, arguing that it was not discriminating against interstate commerce. First, California argued that it could not be discriminating because
it was not treating similarly situated entities differently. In other words,
California argued that the LCFS was facially neutral, and it was not California’s fault that the Midwestern producers happened to have more of the
qualities—high carbon intensity—that California was regulating. 168 “Under
the LCFS,” explained California, “all ethanols are regulated in the same
manner,” and the standard “has no . . . on/off switch” responding to in- and
out-of-state ethanols differently. 169
In defense of its use of transportation distance as a factor in assigning
carbon intensity, California noted that the measure was not the dispositive
factor in the carbon intensity value assigned. California pointed out that, as
originally promulgated, there was “no correlation between in-state status
and lowest CI values or out-of-state status and highest CI values.” 170 Since
then, with CARB’s option for entities to request an individualized CI value,
Midwestern producers’ averages were still in the same range as California
producers (if a little higher on average), and there were “five Midwest
ethanol pathways with lower CI values than the value for which California
plants have registered.” 171 In sum, California argued, the LCFS was not
discriminatory “both because it distinguishes among fuels based on carbon
intensity, rather than origin, and because it provides the flexibility for low
carbon fuel producers to apply for a lower, individualized CI value, regardless of the location of their facility.” 172
Finally, California argued that, even taking the transportation into account, there was no discriminatory purpose against Midwestern ethanol,
and no discriminatory effect. It pointed out that “inclusion of emissions
from transportation provides a net advantage to Midwest corn ethanol
plants compared to California corn ethanol plants, because of the inclusion
of the emissions for transporting the corn (which is grown in the Midwest).” 173 Overall, it argued, there was “no relative ‘penalty’ to Midwest
168.
Defendants’ Memorandum o� Points and Authorities in Opposition to RMFU’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–7, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843
Supp. 2d 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 09CV02234), 2010 WL 5882464 [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum].
169.
Id. at 6–7.
170.
Id. at 7 (noting that in-state ranges were originally 77.44 to 88.90, whereas out-ofstate ranges were originally 58.40 to 120.99).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. at 9.
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producers based on their distance from California.” 174 For all of these reasons, California argued that “the true purposes of the LCFS . . . are the
antithesis of protectionism,” because a primary goal of the standard was to
“encourage the development and commercialization o� lower carbon fuels,
which will diversify the market, not contract it.” 175
In his opinion, Judge O’Neill agreed with the Plaintiffs that strict scrutiny analysis was appropriate. He cited Plaintiffs’ contentions that CARB
had assigned Midwestern sources a roughly 10 percent higher CI score than
their California counterparts, and he found that the “LCFS and Table 6 [of
the LCFS] explicitly differentiate among ethanol pathways based on origin
(Midwest vs. California) and activities inextricably intertwined with origin
(electricity provided by Midwest power companies vs. California power
suppliers and interstate transportation).” 176 He found that this explicit
differentiation, leading to “higher CI scores based on, inter alia, the location
of the production facility and the distance the product travels . . . discriminates against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol on its face.” 177 Due to this
facial discrimination, he applied the strict scrutiny test.
Judge O’Neill dismissed California’s arguments that the higher CI
scores were based on permissible scientific, non-discriminatory bases. Despite the State’s assertions, Judge O’Neill found that the total regime
“assign[ed] favorable assumptions to California while penalizing out-ofstate competitors,” “treat[ed] electricity generate [sic] outside of the state
differently than electricity generated inside its border,” and tied judgments
to miles traveled—all of which were factors that discriminated against
interstate commerce. 178 His judgment was ultimately grounded in the “effects” prong of the strict scrutiny test—while he acknowledged that the
LCFS was not discriminatory in its purpose, it nevertheless discriminated
on its face through its effects in interstate commerce. That is, since the
LCFS could have the effect of raising the price o� Midwestern ethanol
relative to California ethanol, it impermissibly affected the interstate market. 179
The choice of the strict scrutiny test is problematic for several reasons.
First, it was almost conceded, even by the Plaintiffs, that there was no
protectionist motive in the LCFS—a motive that is often invoked as a
rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause’s uncompromising stance in
174.
Id.
175.
Id. at 12.
176.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086–87
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2013).
177.
Id. at 1087.
178.
Id. at 1088.
179.
Id. at 1088–90.
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these cases. 180 The Supreme Court strikes down state laws that appear to
have a protectionist effect, even without determining whether protectionism truly was a motivation of the legislature. 181 A prime example of this is
in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, in which the Court
noted skeptically the protectionist effects of an apple labeling law purporting to protect consumers, but not rationally advancing that interest. 182
Here, on the other hand, even the Plaintiffs acknowledged that California
did not stand to benefit from its look-up tables. For example, they alleged
in the Complaint that the LCFS tended to assign more favorable scores to
sugar cane, grown largely in Brazil and elsewhere overseas, than to even
Californian ethanol. 183 This favorable result for Brazilian producers, argued
the Plaintiffs, would effectively “require regulated entities producing gasoline for sale in California quickly to try to obtain ethanol produced in
Brazil, not the United States,” injuring in the process “the business of all
corn ethanol biorefineries in the United States, including those located in
California.” 184 Moreover, neither the Plaintiffs nor Judge O’Neill suggested
there was anything other than a (perhaps misguided) desire to cure the ills
of global warming motivating California’s adoption of the LCFS. Since the
“purpose of the Commerce Clause is to prohibit outright economic protectionism or regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic actors
by burdening out-of-state actors,” and that the dormant Commerce Clause
works to “ferret out this illicit motive,” it is inapposite to employ the strict
scrutiny test, in all its rigor, in a case empty of evidence of protectionism. 185
Ultimately, as Judge O’Neill conceded, 186 this case presented a different
angle on the dormant Commerce Clause than is typical of those cases. Not
180.
See, e.g., id. at 1086 (“ ‘The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is
to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism.’ ”) (quoting
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).
181.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977).
182.
Id.
183.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 43.
184.
Id.
185.
E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court o� Magoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997).
186.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D.
Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013) (“The Court concludes that the LCFS offends the Commerce Clause after considering
the unique challenge presented. This is not the quintessential dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. Clearly, a law that compels the use of in-state products or forbids the use of outof-state products would violate the Commerce Clause. See, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller,
44 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995). So, too, would a law that imposes a surcharge on an out-ofstate product made in an identical fashion. See, Oregon Waste [Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality
Comm’n], 511 U.S. [93,] 100 (1994). While the ethanol made in the Midwest and California
are physically and chemically identical when ultimately mixed with petroleum, and while the
pathways may be the similar, this Court appreciates that the carbon intensities of these two
otherwise-identical products are different according to lifecycle analysis.”).
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only did the LCFS not serve a protectionist motive for California; it also
failed to discriminate in an orderly way. As both parties pointed out, Brazilian sugarcane producers scored better on the whole than other parties did,
and some Midwestern producers scored better than some California producers. The general spread of the CI values points to the truth of CARB’s
assertions that it was merely trying to sensibly order fuels based on their
carbon intensity for scientific purposes, rather than advancing a secret
motive to promote California’s economy.
Given these considerations, the only way in which the strict scrutiny
test was applicable to the LCFS was through the “effects” test—the law
facially discriminated in its effects—but not simply in its application. As
Judge O’Neill wrote, a law “is facially discriminatory when it ‘is not necessary to look beyond the text of this statute to determine that it
discriminates against interstate commerce.’ ” 187 He continued to explain
that “ ‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.” 188 According to the case law Judge O’Neill consulted, then, a law
would need to treat in- and out-of-state interests differently in its text, and
that differential treatment would need to be grounded in protectionism.
The effects test is not met by simply demonstrating that a law has effects in
interstate commerce at all—if this were the case, the Pike balancing test
would not exist. To merit strict scrutiny review, a law must discriminate in
effect on its face by treating out-of-state entities differently than in-state
ones. Moreover, in-state actors must also benefit from the legislation. 189 It
is hard to conclude that the LCFS met this standard.
Even conceding that the look-up tables, on the whole, demonstrated a
“boost” in CI scores for Midwestern ethanol on average, that does not
merit the conclusion that Californian interests benefited from imposing
burdens on out-of-state interests. As all parties conceded, California did
not stand to benefit significantly from the LCFS. Moreover, the only aspect of the law that is susceptible to this interpretation is Table 6, which
demonstrates an inconsistent and slight disadvantage for Midwestern interests. Finally, the burden it imposes on Midwestern interests is still
somewhat speculative: 190 the harm the Plaintiffs alleged was a potential
187.
Id. at 1086 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town o� Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 575–76 (1997)).
188.
Id. (citing Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99).
189.
E. Ky. Res., 127 F.3d at 543. The Sixth Circuit wrote that “there are two complementary components to a claim that a statute has a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce: the claimant must show both how local economic actors are favored by the
legislation, and how out-of-state actors are burdened by the legislation.”
190.
See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 94, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135).
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increase in prices Midwestern producers would have to pass on to consumers because they, on average, would have higher compliance costs than
groups with, on average, lower CI scores. This speculative, slight, and inconsistent burden on out-of-state parties does not rise to the level of
dormant Commerce Clause cases, and it is hard to understand how the
rationale of the exacting strict scrutiny test is served in this case. This is
especially true taking into account CARB’s attempts to make the LCFS
responsive
to
individual
requests
for
CI
adjustments, and the agency’s scientific and economic justifications for the
mechanisms of the Table.
Given Judge O’Neill’s analysis, it is possible that no regime serving the
LCFS’s avowed goals could survive strict scrutiny. That is, a regime like the
LCFS would apparently have to ignore the impact of transportation distance on CI, which would reduce the accuracy and efficacy of the standard.
This is especially true if the scheme would have to cease to consider all of
the variables that led CARB to conclude that Midwestern ethanol was, on
average, higher in CI than some other sources. For example, if CARB could
not make any conclusions based on factual regional differences (such as the
ways in which the corn was grown), the CI results would not reflect reality
and would not allow the State to make a meaningful carbon-reduction
effort. The dormant Commerce Clause frequently does foreclose states
from pursuing projects, so the fact that this analysis might stymie California’s wishes does not mean the analysis is wrong. However, the serious
practical difficulties of complying with Judge O’Neill’s interpretation of the
constitutional mandates, when combined with the tenuous match between
typical strict scrutiny analysis and the LCFS, make the application of this
test a surprising result.
A different result might be mandated in the case if the LCFS considered the precise number of miles traveled by a transportation fuel, whether
within or without California. Table 6’s averages currently provide one
transportation input for CI; all Californian producers are subject to the
same average transportation value of 8.1gCO2e/MJ, regardless of where
they are located within the state. 191 However, there would likely be an unreasonably high burden placed on CARB if it had to calculate the precise
number of miles traveled to the ultimate point of sale. Such a regime would
disable CARB from administering categories of CI at all—it would effectively have to perform an individual CI analysis for each batch of vehicle
fuel. However, conceptually such a program might satisfy Judge O’Neill, if
not the Plaintiffs, that transportation was no longer a factor used to discriminate against interstate commerce. The use of transportation miles to
191.

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013).
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increase the CI of out-of-state fuels, but not in-state fuels, is the best argument that that factor was uniquely discriminatory to out-of-state interests.
Finally, in a close case such as this one, the State might argue that
courts should defer to its judgment—at least to the limited extent that a
court might err on the side of applying the more forgiving Pike balancing
test as opposed to the strict scrutiny test when there are strong arguments
for both tests. In other words, due to the general principles of state sovereignty and federalism enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, it might be
appropriate to add a new rule to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine:
that when a statute does not clearly discriminate on its face, that a court
should apply the Pike test. In this case, Judge O’Neill appears to have done
the opposite: facing a strong argument from both sides at the test selection
step, he chose to apply the “fatal in fact” strict scrutiny test. This approach
raises concerns about states’ autonomy.

2. Legitimate Local Purpose
Rocky Mountain is momentous in that it appears to be the first case in
which a state asserted that global warming was a legitimate local purpose
for the purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. As such, the analysis of
this prong of the strict scrutiny test may set the foundations for future state
challenges, should other states adopt controversial measures such as A.B.
32. Despite the high stakes in this question, and despite Judge O’Neill’s
generally unfavorable outcomes regarding the LCFS, his holding briefly
and decisively stated that global warming was a legitimate purpose. This
decision and its reasoning may have come as a surprise to both parties. The
Ninth Circuit did not disturb the lower court’s ruling in its analysis. 192
The Plaintiffs leaned heavily on the relative sizes of the immense global warming problem and the modest LCFS to demonstrate that California’s
regulatory scheme did not serve a legitimate local purpose. First, they
argued that “GHG emissions mix into the atmosphere so thoroughly that
their only effects are worldwide,” such that “the immediate locality from
which the GHG is emitted is affected no more or no less than the entire
world.” 193 In other words, no locality would be able to assert global warming
as a legitimate local purpose, since the problem was inherently global, and
“a ton of GHG emitted in India or China has the same effect on GHGs in
California as a ton of GHGs emitted in California or Iowa.” 194 If this were
truly the case, the Plaintiffs would have foreclosed all potential state regulation of global warming, since no locality could assert an injury greater than
any other state’s or locality’s injury from GHG emissions.
192.
193.
194.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
Complaint, supra note 39, para. 52.
Id.
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Second, the Plaintiffs agued that global warming could not serve as a
legitimate local purpose because California was the only state to attempt to
regulate in this way, resulting in negligible or even zero net change in GHG
emissions. They alleged that the LCFS would simply incentivize producers
to shuffle their existing fuels: they would “ ‘ship lower-carbon-intensity
fuels’ to California, ‘while shipping higher-carbon-intensity fuels elsewhere.’ ” 195 Producers would thereby comply with the LCFS by rearranging
their shipments, and no net carbon decrease would occur. In other words,
the Plaintiffs asserted that no single state could achieve GHG reductions by
capping the amount of carbon intensity of its fuels without exporting a
similar regulatory scheme elsewhere to truly constrain the behavior of industry.
Finally, the Plaintiffs essentially argued that since California admittedly could not make a significant impact on global warming through the
LCFS alone, that global warming could not be a legitimate local purpose.
They quoted CARB in their complaint as having acknowledged that
“ ‘GHG emission reductions by the LCFS alone will not result in significant climate change,’ ” and that “ ‘[i]t is unlikely that the LCFS alone will
result in any measurable climate change and reduction of global warming.’ ” 196 This set of admissions by CARB factored into the Plaintiffs’ overall
assertion that “there are virtually no local benefits to the LCFS regulation.” 197 In other words, global warming could not be a legitimate local
purpose if California stood to gain nothing from the regulatory tool it had
chosen to attack the problem.
California argued that global warming could be a local interest, if not
because the regulated GHGs truly affected California specially, but simply
because a global reduction in total GHG amount would work benefits in
California. The State cited the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA,
which decided that Massachusetts had standing to pursue a claim against
198
the EPA for failing to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act. In its
brief, the State confidently quoted the court: the fact that the “climatechange risks are ‘widely-shared’ does not minimize [California’s] interest in
199
reducing them.” From this, the State concluded briefly that “California’s
200
purpose [in the LCFS] is both legitimate and local.”

195.
Id. at para. 50 (emphasis added).
196.
Id. at para. 53.
197.
Id. at para. 56.
198.
Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 168, at 12–13. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 479, 522 (2007).
199.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200.
Id.
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A significant problem that California failed to address in its brief is
that the Court did not discuss California’s interest in global warming in the
Massachusetts case. Instead, where California inserted its name, it simply
replaced “Massachusetts.” 201 Had the Court written that the widespread
impacts of climate change do not reduce any state’s interest in them, California’s move would appear less daring. But the State put forward neither
factual nor legal arguments as to why Massachusetts’s interest for standing
purposes was identical to and applicable to California’s interest for Commerce Clause purposes. This is of concern because of the legal differences
between these two cases and the factual background relied on by the Court
in Massachusetts v. EPA to justify why Massachusetts had an interest in
global warming, discussed infra.
California proceeded to rebut the Plaintiffs’ arguments that regulated
entities’ opportunistic “resource shuffling” would eliminate any net carbon
reductions. First, it argued that plants selling fuel both in and outside of
California would have incentives to produce lower-carbon fuel overall,
rather than exclusively selling lower-carbon fuels in-state and continuing
business as usual for other target states—for example, it would be more
efficient to produce all fuel the same way, rather than maintaining separate
product lines merely to keep non-California-bound fuels higher in CI. 202
Furthermore, the State argued that the LCFS complemented the EPA’s
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2), “providing additional incentives for
incremental reductions in emissions within RFS2 categories o� fuels.” 203
In his opinion, Judge O’Neill agreed with California that Massachusetts
v. EPA meant global warming was a legitimate local purpose for California. 204 He wrote that “Defendants’ [sic] correctly point out that in
Massachusetts v. EPA . . . the Supreme Court recognized that a state has a
‘well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory’ from the threats of
rising seas and other impacts of global warming.” 205 He, too, quoted the
passage CARB had relied on: “ ‘That these climate-change risks are ‘widelyshared’ does not minimize [California’s] interest’ in reducing them.” 206
Most notably, Judge O’Neill followed California’s lead and substituted
“California” for “Massachusetts” in the quote without comment about the
factual distinctions, if any, between those two states. 207 Finally, he disposed
of the issue whether the standing inquiry in Massachusetts v. EPA differed
201.
See id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
205.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519).
206.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522).
207.
Id.
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meaningfully from the LCFS case by remarking that the Supreme Court
“explained in dicta that a state has a local and legitimate interest in reducing global warming,” which satisfied him that global warming served a
legitimate local purpose. 208 He offered no citations or further commentary
on what dicta established that principle, and for what purposes it is legitimate.
The first important issue, unresolved by the opinion, is by what reasoning California has a legitimate local purpose in global warming. On the text
of the opinion, Judge O’Neill seems to justify this result based on his reading of Massachusetts v. EPA as a blanket statement that all states have a
legitimate local purpose in global climate change. However, this interpretation implicitly chooses one potential justification for the holding that
Massachusetts had an interest in climate change, and ignores another strong
one.
The rationale from Massachusetts v. EPA that Judge O’Neill appears to
follow, borrowing from California’s brief, 209 is that a state has a special
status as sovereign to regulate affairs in its territory. The Massachusetts v.
EPA Court wrote in dicta that “States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” 210 The Court cited a century-old
case in which the Supreme Court held that Georgia “has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” 211 The
Court reasoned that “[j]ust as Georgia’s independent interest ‘in all the
earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century
ago, so too does Massachusetts’ [sic] well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory today.” 212 It concluded that, given these considerations,
Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis. 213
The second justification for Massachusetts’s interest in global warming,
according to the Supreme Court, stemmed from its position as coastal
landowner. Since the risks of global warming threatened to erode and swallow some o� Massachusetts’s coastline, the State had more traditional
standing as a landowner to contest acts and omissions that might take its
property. The Court noted that the rising sea levels “have already begun to
swallow Massachusetts’ [sic] coastal land,” and that the State, as the owner
of “a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,” had alleged “a par208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 168, at 12–13.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 518–19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
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ticularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.” 214 The injury to the State
as a landowner would continue to increase with predicted global climate
change. 215 Finally, the State would incur significant remediation costs due
to these injuries. 216
Given this analysis, it is possible to explain Massachusetts’ interest in
global warming in three ways: it derives either from its sovereignty, or from
its coastal land ownership, or both. Judge O’Neill described the sovereignty
reasoning as “dicta” establishing “that a state has a local and legitimate
interest in reducing global warming.” 217 He did not address the land ownership prong, so, based on his holding, it may be either an alternative basis for
establishing a local interest in climate change, or an optional extra factor.
The second important consideration in this analysis is to what extent
the standard for standing, discussed in Massachusetts v. EPA, applies to the
dormant Commerce Clause issue o� legitimate local purpose. The Supreme
Court established that Massachusetts was owed “special solicitude” in the
standing analysis, largely due to its status as a sovereign. 218 This does not
suggest that the State might be owed special solicitude in all analyses, however. In other words, the Court’s “sovereign” rationale for Massachusetts’
interest in global warming may not reach other legal questions. Critically
here, the “sovereign” analysis may not be relevant to Commerce Clause
questions. This is especially likely given that the underlying rationale of the
dormant Commerce Clause is to restrain the activities of states, not to offer
them “special solicitude.” Given these considerations, it is troubling if California and Judge O’Neill rested their analysis of California’s local interest
simply on its status as a state and by substituting the name of California for
that o� Massachusetts in the Supreme Court’s reasoning, since that reasoning does not reach the Commerce Clause by its terms, and does not serve
the same interests.
Despite the questions remaining about this analysis, if it is upheld it
creates a valuable precedent for states wishing to regulate global warming.
It adopts an expansive reading of Massachusetts v. EPA, suggesting that for
any legal test requiring a state to assert an interest in global warming, any
state has such an interest. The State does not appear to need to allege any
further facts to benefit from this analysis. For example, under the “land
ownership” rationale that Judge O’Neill did not use, a state wishing to
assert a local interest in climate change would have to demonstrate that it
owns land or other interests that would suffer harm because of the specific
214.
Id. at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215.
Id. at 522–23.
216.
See id. at 523.
217.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
218.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520.
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predicted effects of global warming. For some states, like California, this
burden is not likely to be very difficult: California owns substantial portions of its coastline, which suggests that it would have a similar argument
as Massachusetts had that it would be injured as a land owner due to rising
sea levels. 219 However, landlocked states, such as Iowa, could not assert
similar injuries; they might have to develop other arguments for how they
would be injured as land-owners due to other predicted local effects of
climate change. For example, states might be able to allege that predicted
droughts and other weather phenomena tied to climate change would damage their natural resources. This would involve a good deal o� factual
analysis, and would present a more challenging burden in such cases.
Finally, another positive development arising out of this opinion, from
the point of view of states wishing to regulate climate change, is the lack of
importance of redressability. Judge O’Neill declined even to address the
Plaintiffs’ arguments that climate change could not be a legitimate local
purpose because the state could not alter its outcome. In the standing context, as in Massachusetts v. EPA, a plaintif�’s injury must be redressable to
establish standing: plaintiffs must demonstrate that, even if the court ruled
in their favor, the result would have some impact on their injury. 220 This
prong, too, would be challenging for a state to prove: California would
almost certainly fail to demonstrate that the reductions in CI from the
LCFS (10 percent by 2020) would result in less global climate change overall. 221 Redressability has never been an explicit factor in evaluating a
legitimate local purpose, however; courts have not analyzed this question. 222
The term “local interest” implies that the locality has some interest in the
outcome, but not necessarily that the locality can alter the outcome. Moreover, the analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA offers some relief to parties
attempting to assert a local interest in climate change: the court wrote that
“[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.” 223 That is, even if
emissions continue to rise globally, the fact that a state makes even the
smallest reduction still reduces the emissions relative to what would have
been current emissions had the state not acted.

219.
See, e.g., How Beaches Work: Recreation & Preservation, COASTAL CLASH, KQED,
http://www.kqed.org/w/coastalclash/recreation.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
220.
See Lujan v. Defenders o� Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
221.
See infra text accompanying note 251.
222.
In a review o� Westlaw cases discussing both redressability and legitimate local
purpose, redressability is only discussed in reference to standing; it does not enter the
legitimate local purpose analysis.
223.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
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3. Extraterritoriality
As an alternative argument, the Plaintiffs alleged that the LCFS regulated extraterritoriality. If true, this would require a court to employ the
strict scrutiny test. Therefore, if the LCFS either discriminated or regulated extraterritorially, the strict scrutiny test would be appropriate. These two
ways of getting to strict scrutiny are often muddled, however, and some
courts refuse to employ extraterritoriality at all. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs
strongly alleged that it applied here.
The Plaintiffs argued that the LCFS should receive strict scrutiny because, “[i]n actuality and in practical effect, [it] regulates conduct and
commerce occurring wholly outside of California.” 224 Tied in with this
argument o� factual extraterritorial regulation, the Plaintiffs consistently
emphasized that the “purpose of assigning carbon intensity values to fuels
used in California is to change behavior occurring completely outside the
state.” 225 They insisted that the State was regulating “how out-of-state corn
ethanol producers and importers” behave by “encouraging regulated parties
to minimize the assumed carbon emissions throughout the putative lifecycle
of a fuel,” since the LCFS took into consideration purely Midwestern
“farming, crop yields, harvesting practices, crop collection and transportation, fuel used in production, and energy efficiency of production” as well
as the distance the product traveled. 226 Worse, the scheme took “indirect
land use” into account, which the Plaintiffs cast as the “breathtaking extraterritoriality” of the LCFS. 227 In sum, the Plaintiffs argued, “the LCFS
unconstitutionally projects California state policy outside its borders.” 228
The State argued that the LCFS did not violate any of the three extraterritoriality principles it argued were important: it did not regulate
behavior occurring wholly outside the State; it did not threaten economic
Balkanization; and it did not only regulate interstate commerce (leaving
California-only commerce alone). 229 By breaking up the inquiry in this way,
the State could “divide and conquer,” attempting to defuse the Plaintiffs’
arguments that extraterritorial effects alone satisfied this test. First, it
insisted that the LCFS was not regulation of out-of-state behavior, but instead it was simply treating that behavior differently once its products
arrived in California. 230 That is, creating a market-based system with values
was not regulation of what occurred in the Midwest: if the fuel producers
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Complaint, supra note 39, para. 84.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Memorandum in Support o� Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 165, at 14.
Complaint, supra note 39, at 18.
Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 168, at 14.
Id.
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complied with California’s regulations, it would be “to compete for business
in California, not because there is any legal requirement” to do so. 231 California emphasized that its regulations imposed no requirements on fuels
not sold in California. 232 Next, it argued that the LCFS did not cause economic Balkanization because it imposed no “transportation penalty and no
trade barriers,” and it did not regulate the channels of interstate commerce. 233 Here again, the State distinguished its market tool from a
regulation: while transportation was a factor in the LCFS’s calculations, the
regulations did not impose trade barriers. Producers could import into
California as much as they liked.
Judge O’Neill agreed with the Plaintiffs. 234 In holding that the LCFS
controlled extraterritorial conduct, he created an alternative basis for his use
of the strict scrutiny test. His rationale centered on the Plaintiffs’ arguments about practical effects: “Defendants cannot dispute that the ‘practical
effect’ of the regulation would be to control” the farming practices and
other factors occurring in the Midwest that were conducive to higher CI
scores. 235 He also enlisted some of the Plaintiffs’ “purpose” rationale, reminding California that its regulations situated it as the primary regulator
of the GHG intensity o� Midwestern corn ethanol production. 236 Finally,
he found that California’s detailed regulations requiring producers to get
California’s approval before changing their transportation method amounted to “ ‘forc[ing] a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before
undertaking a transaction in another,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly regulate[] interstate commerce.’ ” 237
As elsewhere, this question raises conceptual difficulties. California is
undoubtedly correct that the LCFS does not directly regulate extraterritorial conduct; it only touches those fuels that actually enter California. More
importantly, the LCFS does not regulate or restrict at all—it merely provides a framework for a market-based program. At no point would any fuel
be restricted from entry; it may simply be much more expensive to import. 238 By this same token, the Plaintiffs and Judge O’Neill are also correct
that the LCFS must have the effect of altering behavior outside California’s
borders. At the very least, the LCFS is intended to have the effect of reduc231.
Id. at 15.
232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 18.
234.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 1091–92.
237.
Id. at 1092 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986)).
238.
As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit found similar difficulties in the lower
court’s reasoning.
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ing the amount of GHG emissions associated with the fuels it imports,
which would mean either that the imported fuels are produced differently
over time (and California’s regulations effected a change in farming or other
production methods elsewhere), or that outside parties would make a different decision about which fuels to make available in California. In either
event, some different choice would be made outside California’s borders
due to the regulatory scheme within the state. If this is enough to qualify as
extraterritorial regulation, then perhaps the result is correct.
In his Extraterritoriality section, Judge O’Neill draws in language about
“practical effects,” which is another, separate way for a state to discriminate
and be subject to the strict scrutiny test. 239 His concluded that California
“cannot dispute that the ‘practical effect’ of [the LCFS] would be to control” the land use practices in the Midwest and Brazil that resulted in
higher carbon emissions. 240 He did not hold, however, that the LCFS discriminated against interstate commerce in practical effect; his application of
the strict scrutiny test was instead based on his holdings that the LCFS
discriminated facially and regulated extraterritorially. 241
Ultimately, however, Judge O’Neill’s conception of extraterritoriality
and discriminatory effects cuts too broadly. If every state regulation that
has some impact on interstate markets is deemed to be extraterritorial or to
have discriminatory effects, then states’ abilities to operate without implicating the Commerce Clause is decidedly constricted. The LCFS is best
thought of as an information-gathering mechanism; it places no restrictions
on products or actors, and it operates blindly with respect to in-state and
out-of-state parties (i.e., the same regime applies within and without). It is
true that there are necessarily impacts outside of California, but the other
tests—discrimination and the Pike balancing test—exist to smoke out this
type of issue. Therefore, extraterritoriality and practical effects are both too
broad if they encompass this situation. As the Ninth Circuit found, 242 extraterritoriality is not a good fit for understanding the LCFS. It remains to
be seen whether the district court will, on remand, find that the LCFS
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical effect.

239.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
240.
Id.
241.
Id. at 1105. As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit remanded to determine whether
the LCFS discriminated in practical effect.
242.
See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013) (reversing “the district court’s decision that the Fuel Standard is an impermissible
extraterritorial regulation”).
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4. Alternatives
In the strict scrutiny test, once a legitimate local purpose has been
identified, the final step is to determine whether there were any nondiscriminatory alternatives the State could have used to achieve that interest without impacting interstate commerce. 243 As the Plaintiffs argued that
no legitimate local purpose was present, they put forth no arguments about
alternatives in their briefs. 244 However, the State and the court did continue
to this step after agreeing that global warming was a legitimate local purpose. Here, however, they disagreed.
The State argued to the district court that there were no alternatives
that would allow California to reduce its carbon footprint. It emphasized
that “a lifecycle analysis is the only effective way to regulate emissions from
transportation fuels.” 245 According to the State, any other method would
“miss critical contributors to the lifecycle and may result in greater, rather
than lower, emissions overall,” making AB 32’s desired 10 percent reduction
in emissions “impossible to achieve.” 246
Judge O’Neill disagreed. He found that because California could have
reduced its carbon footprint through other schemes, specifically a carbon
tax, it had alternatives. 247 Like his finding that global warming was a legitimate local purpose, Judge O’Neill spent relatively little time on this
section o� his analysis. He emphasized that it was California’s burden to
demonstrate that there were no “other nondiscriminatory means” to achieve
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 248 He found that California had
failed to do so, but that affidavits presented by the Plaintiffs had suggested
a few. These included adopting “an LCFS that does not contain the discriminatory components”; “a tax on fossil fuels”; and “regulating only
tailpipe GHG emissions in California.” 249 The court noted that California
“speculate[d] that [tailpipe GHG emissions regulation only] may result in
greater . . . emissions overall, though CARB stated that GHG emissions
could be reduced by increasing vehicle efficiency or reducing the number of
vehicle miles traveled.” 250 Judge O’Neill conceded that “these approaches
may be less desirable, for a number of reasons,” but that concession did not
alter the fact that California had “failed to establish there are no nondis243.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986).
244.
See, e.g., Memorandum in Support o� Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
165 at 9–10.
245.
Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 168, at 13.
246.
Id.
247.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093-94 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
248.
Id. at 1093.
249.
Id. at 1093–94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250.
Id. at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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criminatory means by which California could serve its purpose of combating global warming through the reduction of GHG emissions.” 251
One question arising from Judge O’Neill’s analysis of alternatives is the
burden of proof. Some of the only helpful discussions on this step of the
strict scrutiny test comes from Maine v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court
deferred to the district court’s finding that Maine had no alternatives but to
ban the importation o� baitfish to control invasive species. 252 There, the
Court looked for “scientifically accepted techniques” to accomplish the valid
state goals. 253 Therefore, the necessities of science do play a role here; California is owed deference in its assertions about the requisites for creating a
functional system. Judge O’Neill’s analysis implies that a regime that addresses the legitimate local purpose, whether or not it does so well, suffices
as a reasonable alternative. A question that remains largely unanswered in
the case law is how similar an alternative must be in order for it to be a
legitimate alternative, and who bears the burden of demonstrating its suitability. The Maine v. Taylor Court offers little guidance, except that a district
court’s finding of no alternatives should receive some deference. It does not
provide a standard for when a district court’s finding that alternatives did
exist should be overturned.
Since the district court’s findings o� fact are the jumping-off point for
the future analysis in the Maine v. Taylor framework, Judge O’Neill’s finding that a carbon tax was an alternative is very important. With the carbon
tax as the alternative California must compare the LCFS to, there are additional problems: the carbon tax would either be discriminatory in exactly
the same way as the LCFS, 254 or else would be equally as ineffective as the
LCFS would be without the location-based CI factors. That is, if California
enacted a pure carbon tax on the amount of GHGs emitted by the burning
of various fuels, the tax would not capture the extraneous GHG emissions
associated with the production of the fuels. 255 This is, of course, the precise
problem the LCFS sought to remedy in the cap-and-trade scheme: it could
have based its cap-and-trade regime on the pure chemical properties of the
fuels, but it elected to include the other factors in the CI score for accuracy’s sake and to prevent leakage. 256 The carbon tax context is no different in
this regard; no matter how California chooses to raise the cost of emitting
251.
Id.
252.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146 (1986).
253.
Id.
254.
See generally Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 511 U.S. 93, 99–
100 (1994) (discussing state taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce).
255.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 190, at 99–100.
256.
The Plaintiffs pointed out that nearly all ethanol in the United States is fungible:
98 percent of it is derived from corn, and corn ethanol made anywhere by any process is
completely identical to all other corn ethanol. See Complaint, supra note 39, para. 14.
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GHGs, it must capture all sources of GHG emissions related to a fuel in
order to do so accurately. No one disputes that these factors include, for
example, distance transported and land use.
The above criticism of the carbon tax approach demonstrates the importance of the uncertainty regarding alternatives: after Maine v. Taylor, it
is unclear how good an alternative must be in order for it to be considered
an alternative. Here, the alternative appears no better than the existing law:
both violate the dormant Commerce Clause, under Judge O’Neill’s reasoning, if they accurately capture all GHG emissions related to a fuel. If the
only alternative that might serve the same purposes for a legitimate state
interest is also discriminatory against interstate commerce, this creates a
more compelling argument for the proposition that there are no alternatives
at all, and that even a discriminatory law should survive strict scrutiny. In
other words, if all of California’s regulatory options necessarily involve a
discriminatory CI score, then there are no alternatives and the law must be
upheld, even if there are several choices of which type of discriminatory
regime to enact.
On the other hand, if the only alternative that the court provides can be
shown not to produce the benefits California desires to serve its legitimate
local purpose, this is another strong argument that there are in fact no
alternatives. This is the result if California’s alternative is to enact a CI-less
carbon tax or simply strip the CI from the LCFS. In either case, it would
not capture the true GHG impact of the fuels, and would encourage opportunistic “fuel shuffling” to avoid the impact of the LCFS. 257 For example, a
Midwestern producer whose lifecycle emissions are 10 percent higher than a
California producer’s (in terms o� fuel consumed in California) might receive treatment in the market as if its emissions were equal to the
California producer’s, as long as the fuels are chemically identical. California would be operating a regulatory regime that significantly
underestimated GHG emissions, and California would not be able to accurately say that it had reduced its total GHG emissions as required by the
overall purpose of AB 32.
Implicit in these issues is the question o� how effective a state’s regime
must be. That is, if California had to show that its regime, whether the
LCFS or a carbon tax, would actually make measurable decreases in global
climate change, this would probably be fatal; California produces just a
fraction of the United States’ total emissions, which are in turn just 19
percent of global emissions—so a 20 percent reduction in California emissions alone, of which the LCFS is just a small part, could not meaningfully

257.

See Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 168, at 13.
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change the global climate. 258 On the other hand, if California can enact a
discriminatory law that has no alternatives, even if it merely makes the
“right moves” but does not reduce climate change, it is in a better position.
If California’s regime goes any distance at all towards its stated goal, it
might pass muster. This consideration is analogous to the divisive
discussion of redressability in the standing context in Massachusetts v. EPA.
There, the majority and dissent split over whether the states and other
plaintiffs had Article III standing, given that—even if the EPA regulated
motor vehicle emissions—the harm might nevertheless continue. 259
Finally, an issue left unaddressed is what bearing, if any, the seriousness
of a problem the state is trying to fix has on consideration of alternatives.
For example, if the LCFS regulated not carbon but instead a pollutant that
only caused mildly itchy skin in a small portion of the population, would
the suitability of the alternatives be less important? As above, this is a question on which the case law provides little guidance. In Maine v. Taylor, there
was no discussion o� how the seriousness of the invasive species problem
bore on the stringency of measures Maine could undertake. It stands to
reason, however, that the greater the peril, the more seriously courts should
take attempts to curb it.

B. Ninth Circuit Appeal
Within days of the judgment from the Eastern District of California,
the State appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit then granted a
stay of the district court’s injunction on April 23, so the LCFS remained in
effect pending the outcome of the appeal. 260 In their briefs, the parties
largely reasserted their allegations from the district court. The State appeared much more concerned with the consideration of alternatives. 261
After all, it knew that if the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge O’Neill that
the strict scrutiny test was appropriate and that global warming was a legitimate local purpose, the State could win if it could only convince the Ninth
Circuit that there were no alternatives.
The State emphasized its technical expertise and precision in developing the LCFS, leaning on the State’s serious scientific objectives. 262 It
implied, therefore, that it was not discriminating due to any forbidden
258.
Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
259.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 544 (2007).
260.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 190, at 9.
261.
See generally id. (opening discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause issue with a
detailed explanation of the “science-based” nature of the LCFS and its necessity in achieving
California’s purpose, and closing the argument with another discussion of the unavailability
of alternatives).
262.
Id. at 1–2.
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protectionist motive; rather, it was using scientific principles to measure
and reduce the amount of carbon emitted in the whole lifecycle o� fuels in
California. 263 California also argued forcefully that, even if the strict scrutiny test applied, there were no viable alternatives for the three main goals:
reducing carbon intensity, quantifying carbon intensity, and spurring development o� lower-carbon fuels. 264 Since the LCFS “reduces the carbon
intensity of transportation fuels,” the State argued, it “captures emission
reductions that cannot be captured by measures requiring GHG reductions
from vehicles or fewer vehicle miles traveled.” 265 Furthermore, the State
argued that lifecycle analysis—looking at every input to fuels’ carbon intensity—was “the only scientifically accepted and effective approach to
accurately quantify emissions fuels and increase the use o� lower carbon
fuels.” 266 Finally, the “LCFS also spurs the innovation of next-generation
fuels that are necessary to achieve the emissions reductions.” 267
In support of its conclusion that “[n]o alternative regulation can achieve
these objectives,” California showed that the suggested alternatives demonstrably would not achieve the objectives. 268 For example, regulations of
tailpipe emissions would not suffice because “California already regulates
vehicle emissions,” and the State had shown “that it cannot secure an additional 16 million metric tons of emissions reductions yearly by solely
regulating vehicle emissions and ignoring the types o� fuel consumed”—
reductions the LCFS would achieve. 269 Similarly, it argued that what the
district court called a non-discriminatory LCFS would amount to
“[s]electively choosing the elements of a fuel’s lifecycle,” which would “render[] the determination of carbon intensity meaningless.” 270
The Ninth Circuit handed down a dormant Commerce Clause decision
in late August 2013 that appears to have presaged its thinking as it prepared
the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union opinion: in Association des Eleveurs de
Canards v. Harris, the court held that a California law banning foie gras (the
fatty liver o� force-fed ducks) neither discriminated against interstate commerce nor directly regulated interstate commerce. 271 In holding that the law
was nondiscriminatory, the court pointed out that location had nothing to
do with the ban: all products based on the force-feeding of ducks, no matter

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See id.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98–100.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et D’Oies v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013).
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where they originated, were equally affected. 272 This suggested that the
court was sympathetic to the authority of states to regulate materials for
moral or ethical reasons, even if such regulation would eliminate a market
for a good. At the same time, the foie gras opinion left open the possibility
that bans taking location into account, arguably including the LCFS, would
incur a different result.
Next, the court held that the foie gras law did not directly regulate interstate commerce (was not extraterritorial) because it was not aimed at
out-of-state producers—it applied equally in- and out-of-state—and because it only banned a way of producing foie gras, rather than banning the
entire product. 273 This was the strongest signal that the Ninth Circuit
might look favorably upon the LCFS: as in the foie gras ban, the LCFS
took a purely procedural look at products, without regard to location. Similarly, the LCFS did not ban high-CI corn ethanol, but merely made it more
expensive to sell it in California.
On September 18, 2013, the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in the
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case, which now bore the caption Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey. 274 In a consolidated opinion deciding the
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to both the state’s crude oil standards
as well as the LCFS, Judge Gould wrote for the majority that the LCFS
neither facially discriminated against interstate commerce nor regulated
extraterritorially. 275 The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court to determine whether the LCFS
“discriminate[d] in purpose or in practical effect.” 276 If it did neither, the
court of appeals directed the district court to apply the Pike balancing
test. 277
In reaching this result, Judge Gould painted a sympathetic picture of
California’s legislation and regulations. 278 He noted initially that California
“has long been in the vanguard of efforts to protect the environment, with a
particular concern for emissions from the transportation sector.” 279 Gould
recounted California’s pioneering role in the Clean Air Act’s development,

272.
Id. at 948.
273.
Id. at 948–50.
274.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). Richard
Corey had replaced James Goldstene as Executive Officer of the California Air and Resources Board in April 2013. ARB Announces Appointment of New Executive Officer, AIR
RESOURCES BOARD, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.ar
b.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=424.
275.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
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for example, leading to its leadership in passing AB 32. 280 He noted that
the LCFS served an important purpose in California’s comprehensive attempts to lower its greenhouse gas emissions: it was the supply-side
regulation aiming at the sources of GHG emissions that the other two
prongs of California’s vehicle standards could not reach. 281
Gould first framed his analysis by determining “which ethanol pathways are suitable for comparison,” because without this step, he could not
find whether similarly-situated producers were being treated differently
and therefore discriminated against. 282 He wrote that “[e]ntities are similarly situated for constitutional purposes if their products compete against
each other in a single market.” 283 Therefore, the district court erred in
“excluding Brazilian ethanol from its analysis,” which would have shown
that California was not discriminating against out-of-state producers. 284
Furthermore, the district court erred by “ignoring GHG emissions related to: (1) the electricity used to power the conversion process, (2) the
efficiency of the ethanol plant, and (3) the transportation of the feedstock,
ethanol, and co-products,” which were factors correlated with location but
were independently valid ways to determine CI. 285 Without a careful analysis of the differences between pathways, Gould concluded, “we cannot
understand whether the challenged regulation responds to genuine threats
o� harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an ethanol pathway.” 286
Most importantly, Gould recognized that merely treating location as a
factor was not facially discriminatory; the State could still show that there
was “ ‘some reason, apart from their origin, to treat’ ” different regions’
products differently. 287 In other words, since there were valid scientific
bases above and beyond mere location of origin to treat the different pathways differently, they did not facially discriminate. 288 The default pathways
in Table 6 “do categorize fuels by their origin, but the carbon intensity
values on that table are not assigned based on the out-of-state character o�
280.
Id. at 1078–79.
281.
Id. at 1079–80. The “Tailpipe Standards,” as CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1
(2012) is known, established “progressively stricter emissions limits for new vehicles,”
whereas the vehicle miles traveled (“VMT Standards”), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65080–81
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 800 of 2013 Reg.Sess., all 2013-2014 1st Ex.Sess. laws, and Res.
Ch. 123), integrated “regional land use, housing, and transportation planning to reduce the
number of ‘vehicle miles traveled’ ” annually. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
730 F.3d at 1079–80.
282
Id. at 1088.
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
Id.
286.
Id. at 1089.
287.
Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
288.
Id.
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fuels”; instead, they were assigned based on objective principles. 289 Therefore, there was no facial discrimination. 290
Likewise, Gould made short work of the argument that California was
regulating in a protectionist manner. 291 Instead, he demonstrated that the
regulations provided no special economic benefit to California. 292 Moreover, California did not need to alter its regime simply because ethanol
producers in the Midwest were more likely to be close to higher-carbon
sources of electricity; “the dormant Commerce Clause does not guarantee
that ethanol producers may compete on the terms they find most convenient.” 293
Finally, Gould concluded that it was not facially discriminatory to
“draw one of the regional categories along its boundary” when California
defined itself as a region in Table 6. 294 Again here, he concluded that the
State had acted reasonably in using its political boundary as a category to
compute CI, as long as it continued to treat sources evenhandedly. 295 The
generalizations in Table 6 merely “balance the desire for a precise assessment with the need to reduce the compliance costs of the system.” 296
Regarding extraterritoriality, Gould wrote that the “Fuel Standard regulates only the California market,” and would not control the behavior of
out-of-state firms. 297 It could merely incentivize their behavior, and therefore it did not regulate extraterritorially. 298 Furthermore, the requirement
that blenders “report any material change to a pathway’s production and
transportation process before it can generate Fuel Standard credits” was not
extraterritorial regulation, because it only applied when a blender sought to
continue selling its goods in California. 299
From a policy standpoint, Gould acknowledged both the dire need that
prompted California to legislate in this way, and the importance of deferring somewhat to states’ autonomy in our federal system. 300 Moreover, a
federalist argument helped Gould conclude that this statute did not put the
nation at risk of economic Balkanization. 301 The Plaintiffs had urged that
California’s law would encourage other states to adopt similar but not iden289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
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tical legislation of their own, which would create an unworkable mix o�
laws, crippling interstate commerce. 302 Gould dismissed this concern, remarking that “[i]f we were to invalidate regulation every time another state
considered a complementary statute, we would destroy the states’ ability to
experiment with regulation.” 303
In general, therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s majority ruling found
that California’s careful scientific choices defeated the broad-brush picture
of the dormant Commerce Clause that the Plaintiffs had put forward. For
the purposes o� facial discrimination, the court held, reasons matter: since
California had well-reasoned methods behind its choices o� how to calculate
CI, it was not discriminatory. 304
The court remanded to the district court to determine whether the
LCFS discriminated in purpose or in practical effect. Of course, Gould
advocated strongly in dicta that California had no discriminatory purpose,
and demonstrated that the LCFS did not on the whole produce a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce given the low CI o� Brazilian
sugarcane. 305 These remarks are forceful suggestions to the lower court not
to hold that the strict scrutiny test applies for these reasons. If the lower
court agrees with Gould’s suggestions, it is then directed to apply the Pike
balancing test, and determine whether the LCFS imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are “ ‘clearly excessive’ in relation to its local
benefits.” 306
Judge Murguia filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 307 She dissented fully from the Court’s opinion regarding the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the LCFS. 308 She objected to the
majority’s focus on the statute’s purpose to help determine whether it discriminated; instead, she would “look only to the text of the LCFS to
determine if it facially discriminates against out-of-state ethanol.” 309 From
Supreme Court precedents, she reasoned that any statute “according more
preferential treatment” to in-state parties at the expense of out-of-state
parties would be facially discriminatory. 310 In Murguia’s view, this reasoning
is appropriate because the majority should have placed its judgments about
California’s reasonableness in the second step of the test, when it examined
302.
Appellees’ Brief at 44, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135).
303.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1105.
304.
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whether the purported reasons for the discrimination were valid. 311 In other
words, the correct application of the strict scrutiny test would not involve
any consideration of the State’s reasons for enacting a potentially discriminatory statute until after the court determines, from the text alone, whether
the statute does discriminate. 312
Having determined that the LCFS facially discriminated based on its
text alone, Murguia would have held that there were alternatives to the
discrimination and therefore the LCFS was not valid. 313 Murguia’s analysis
here was a little puzzling: she suggested that California could have “treated
ethanol produced in efficient plants more favorably than ethanol from
inefficient plants—rather than taking the shortcut of assuming that plants
outside of California are less efficient,” without considering what would
have happened if California plants tended to be more efficient than out-ofstate plants. 314 She also quoted counsel for California at oral argument
stating that “ ‘It’s not our position that the LCFS is the only way the lifecycle could be used. It’s our position that the lifecycle is the only way to accuaccurately measure [GHG] emissions from transportation fuels’ ” without
addressing the inherent problem with that sentence: if there are alternatives, but those alternatives do not “accurately measure” the substance being
measured, are they truly alternatives? 315

C. Pike Arguments
If the lower court on remand finds that the LCFS does not discriminate in purpose or effect, the program will be subjected to the much more
forgiving Pike balancing test. That test is applied to state laws that do not
facially discriminate and do not regulate extraterritoriality, but that have
effects in interstate commerce. 316 There, courts will strike down the state
law only if the effects on interstate commerce outweigh the putative local
benefits of the law. 317 By its terms and in its application, this test is much
more forgiving to states. In stark contrast with the strict scrutiny test, under which virtually every state law is deemed unconstitutional, the Pike test
rarely results in the law being struck down.
Under a Pike balancing test, the court will evaluate whether the burdens
on interstate commerce were outweighed by the benefits the State obtained
from the regime. Here, the burdens are that Midwestern producers are
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
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Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1109.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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subject to higher compliance costs than California producers, and as a result, they may lose market share over time. California buyers may face
disincentives to buy Midwestern ethanol, because its higher CI value would
be costly for them. 318 Due to California’s large size, this would potentially
mean significant losses.
In its briefs, the State argued that, even if the Plaintiffs were correct
that the Midwestern ethanol would lose market share over time, this loss
did not amount to a dormant Commerce Clause violation. As the State
noted, the Plaintiffs’ “bleak scenarios” about the burden imposed upon
them “lack evidentiary support.” 319 Moreover, the State insisted, it had
procedures in place to allow producers to request an individualized CI
score, so that no producer would be forced to operate under an unduly high
averaged score. 320
The strongest argument for the State here, of course, is that Pike is a
balancing test: even if the Midwestern producers would face systemic and
significant losses compared with other producers, these losses must be
examined in the context of the threat of climate change. California’s sovereign interest in protecting itself, both as a State and as a land-owner, and in
protecting its citizens and businesses, from the projected damage wrought
by climate change would almost certainly outweigh partial, and scientifically justified, losses by some Midwestern ethanol producers. On balance,
therefore, the LCFS will almost certainly survive a Pike balancing test on
remand.

V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
After the mostly-favorable Ninth Circuit ruling, California has less to
fear, for the time being. It is still possible that the Plaintiffs will seek en
banc review or certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Otherwise,
on remand to the Eastern District of California, the lower court could also
find that the statute fails the more deferential Pike balancing test. However,
given how lenient the Pike test generally is, it is unlikely that this statute
would fail. This is especially likely given how great the benefits are that
California hopes to obtain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
If the LCFS must still be changed after en banc review or a potential
ruling by the Supreme Court that the statute is discriminatory, California
would need to alter the discriminatory aspects of the law. The district court
318.
See Brief of the AFPM Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135).
319.
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 12, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135).
320.
See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 190, at 24–25, 61.
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focused mainly on Table 6 of the LCFS, wherein the State appeared to add
10 percent CI to all Midwestern corn and ethanol. 321 The State could therefore rewrite this section and issue more findings about precisely why the 10
percent figures were appropriate. Alternatively, it could recalculate the
figures entirely, and ensure that the figures truly reflect the CI of the fuels.
Of course, there would be serious difficulties with this approach. The
whole idea o� Table 6 was to reduce the administrative burden, both on the
state and on regulated entities: the average CIs were intended to save time
and not require parties to painstakingly calculate individual CI values.
Additionally, the LCFS allows entities to request a customized CI value;
this alternative approach might essentially eliminate that option and make
it the default. All fuels might receive a customized CI value, and the program would probably require far greater funding and resources to
administer.
If the Ninth Circuit en banc, or the Supreme Court, were to adopt the
view that all consideration of transportation was discriminatory, California
would be in a much more difficult bind. The State might then need to strip
its CI calculations of everything but the behavior taking place in California
and the chemical properties of the fuels. This would, as the State pointed
out in its briefs, render the CI illogical and toothless: California would be
expending its resources to regulate fuels that were chemically identical, and
perhaps to regulate the seed to tank production of California ethanol, but it
would not be able to accurately measure how much carbon it was reducing
through its efforts. The out-of-state carbon inputs, including transportation, would go uncalculated. 322
If transportation is indeed discriminatory, it may make more sense for
California to scrap the LCFS regime in favor of something like a carbon
tax. However, such a tax could implicate the dormant Commerce Clause
case law on state taxes—the same strict scrutiny analysis could apply to a
state attempting to impose tariffs on out-of-state goods. 323
However, for the moment, the LCFS appears to be out of the woods.
As described in Section IV.C, it has every chance of surviving the Pike
balancing test, and there is no reason to believe now that the Ninth Circuit’s holdings about the absence of discrimination in the LCFS will be
overturned.
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CONCLUSION
The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case provides a window into the
dormant Commerce Clause issues states will face as they enact laws to
address global climate change. First, they will have to dodge the strict
scrutiny test by enacting laws that courts agree are non-discriminatory. If
they fail, as California did here, they must demonstrate that they had no
plausible alternatives in the service of a legitimate local purpose. Despite an
otherwise-unfavorable ruling, Judge O’Neill’s opinion ruled that global
warming was a legitimate local purpose, apparently for all states, without
question. This will be a valuable piece of case law for other states fighting
similar challenges, as it apparently absolves them from having to argue
about their specific, factual harms from climate change. Ultimately, however, it makes more sense given the logic of the dormant Commerce Clause,
and given the unique challenges of climate change, for future courts to
employ the Pike balancing test in considering a carefully-crafted law like the
LCFS. This approach will allow courts properly to balance the state’s approach facing a considerable threat to health and safety.

